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CORPORATIONS-PROMOTION-DISCHARGE OF PROMOTER'S LIABILITY AS BID-
DER AT A BANKRUPTCY SALE-On October I, defendant made the high bid 
at a bankruptcy sale of hotel properties as "Mr. Ash, trustee." Later that 
same day a certificate of incorporation was executed for a corporation with 
Ash as treasurer. On October 4 the proper corporate papers were filed with 
the secretary of state. On October 4 the receivers receipted for the earnest 
money deposit, the instrument acknowledging, as interpreted by the court, 
that the receivers would look to the corporation to complete the contract 
and would not look to Mr. Ash personally. On October 14, the referee 
confirmed the sale to "Mr. Ash, trustee." On October 27 the corporation 
ratified the acts of Mr. Ash. On October 27 the receivers were notified that 
the transaction would not be completed, the property was shortly there-
after resold, and the receivers brought suit. Held, defendant was not per-
sonally liable for the loss realized by resale. Frazier v. Ash, (5th Cir. 1956) 
234 F. (2d) 320. 
718 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 55 
The court relieved defendant of liability on two separate grounds. Faced 
with the contention that since defendant acted as agent for a non-existent 
corporation at the time he made the contract, he was personally liable on 
the contract,1 the court first concluded that although this was the general 
rule, it did not apply where the parties themselves agreed to look to the 
corporation alone for responsibility and the corporation ratified the con-
tract after it came into being.2 The court's second ground for relieving 
defendant of liability is based upon the peculiar aspects of the bankruptcy 
sale transaction. In effect, the court ruled that the bid was binding on 
defendant on the date of the auction, but that the contract as made on 
confirmation was with the corporation and acted to discharge the defendant 
of his liability on the bid.3 This would appear to be the better analysis of 
the problem. That liability is imposed upon the bidder at the time of 
acceptance of his bid but not on the receivers until the time of confirmation 
is the favored rule.4 If the bidder is not a party to the contract as con-
firmed by the court, he should not be liable on the contract.5 This second 
ground makes it apparent that the court in the first part of its opinion un-
necessarily entered into the difficult field of promoter's liability on contracts 
made on behalf of a non-existent corporation.6 Having done so, however, 
the court should have based its decision on the time at which the obliga-
tions of the parties become fixed under the peculiar aspects of the 
bankruptcy sale procedure, rather than the supposed intent of the parties. 
If the contract was formed when the sale was confirmed by the court, then 
1 O'Rorke v. Geary, 207 Pa. 240, 56 A. 541 (1903); Kelner v. Baxter, L.R. 2 C.P. 
174 (1866); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §306, p. 893 (1936). 
2 Carle v. Corban, 127 Va. 223, 103 S.E. 669 (1920); Weeks v. San Angelo Nat. Bank, 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 65 S.W. (2d) 348. See Ehrich and Bunzl, "Promoter's Contracts," 
38 YALE L. J. 1011 (1929) and BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §41, P· 115 (1946). 
s Principal case at 327. 
4 The peculiar arrangement of binding the bidder on his bid while the receivers 
are not bound until confirmation stems from the Bankruptcy Act which requires that 
the sale be subject to "approval of the court." 52 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. (1952) §110, 
sub. f. The general rule binding the purchaser on his bid is expressed in Gordon v. 
Woods, (1st Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 76, and approved by COi.LIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, 
2d ed., §70.93 (9), p. 1044 (1956), and 4 MooRE's COLLIER §70.98, p. 1577 (1942; Supp. 
1955). Contra, In re Susquehanna Chemical Corp., (W.D. Pa. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 917. 
5 This situation was clearly presented in In re Childs Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 
379, a case on which the court in the principal case relied to explain this interchange 
of liability. There defendant was high bidder at a bankruptcy sale, but the contract as 
confirmed was with Molly Weingarten, a fictitious person. The receivers asked specific 
performance against the defendant-bidder. He counterclaimed for the return of his 
earnest money deposit. Specific performance was denied since defendant was not a party 
to the contract, but defendant was also denied return of his deposit money since he was 
bound on the bid • 
.s The language of the court indicates that it employs the concept of ratification to 
account for the interchange of liability between promoter and corporation. Various 
theories have been advanced to explain how a corporation becomes bound by an act 
done before it has come into being, e.g., ratification, adoption, continuing offer, and 
novation. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §38, p. 108 (1946). This problem is ex-
tensively discussed in annotations in 17 A.L.R. 452 (1922), 49 A.L.R. 673 (1927), and 
123 A.L.R. 726 (1939). 
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clearly the defendant is not liable, for he was acting as agent within the 
scope of his authority for a corporation known by the receivers to have 
come into existence several days earlier.1 If, however, the contract was 
formed on the date of the bid, the defendant should be personally liable 
since he was acting as agent for a non-existent corporation.8 Since the 
receivers did not know that the corporation did not exist on the day of the 
bid, they could not have intended to look to an unformed corporation for 
responsibility. Certainly the case is a difficult one, because both the date of 
the bid and that of the contract fix separate liabilities in bankruptcy sales. 
The contract as confirmed, however, was with the corporation itself through 
its agent, and the promoter should not be liable on it. The problem under 
either theory is a narrow one of discharge of a bidder's liability at a bank-
ruptcy sale. Although the court offers no analysis as to how this discharge 
is accomplished, it is apparent that the facts lend themselves readily to the 
concept of novation. Here the court pointed to the receipt to show the in-
tention of the parties not to bind the bidder personally, i.e., the receipt in 
effect acted as a novation.9 The striking and helpful aspect of this case is 
that, since the contract is formed at confirmation, there is adequate oppor-
tunity to spell out the elements of novation at this time. In the instrument 
that is approved by the court the intention to discharge the bidder can be 
specifically expressed, and protection for the bidder from personal liability 
assured. The court's holding rightly gave effect to the intention of the 
parties, but the parties themselves should have been careful to assure them-
selves of this result by embodying the elements of a novation in the contract 
formed at the time of confirmation by the court. 
John Morrow 
7 MECHEM, AGENCY, 4th ed., §296 (1952); BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS, rev. ed., §49, 
p. 137 (1946). 
s Note 1 supra. 
9 From the Childs case, note 5 supra, it is apparent that the novation may be a 
limited one for it may not restore to the bidder his earnest money. 
